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Implementation of the ordinal Shapley value for
an economy with three or more agents
Yusuke Samejima
Abstract
Perez-Castrillo and Wettstein [2004, 2006] have proposed the ordinal Shapley value, a solution concept for pure
exchange economies where utility transfers may be impossible. We propose a game form that fully implements
the ordinal Shapley value in subgame-perfect equilibrium. Our game form differs from the one proposed by
Perez-Castrillo and Wettstein [2005] in that our game form works for economies with three or more agents while
their game form works for economies with three or less agents.
1. Introduction
The ordinal Shapley value is a normative solution concept for pure exchange economies where utility
transfers may be impossible. The solution concept was proposed by Perez-Castrillo andWettstein [2004].1
It is an ordinal solution concept for NTU (non-transferable utility) environments while the Shapley value
introduced by Shapley [1953] is a solution concept for TU games. The ordinal Shapley value and the
Shapley value share desirable properties such as efficiency, consistency, and fairness as discussed in
Perez-Castrillo and Wettstein [2004].
Implementation theory aims to develop a tool for the uninformed social planner who wishes to realize
certain desirable allocations. When the social planner, or the society, attempts to realize desirable
allocations, he must collect information on the preferences of members in the society. However, it is
often the case that the social planner has difficulty in collecting such information while the concerned
members share much information on each other. For such circumstances, a game form, also called a
1The working paper by Perez-Castrillo and Wettstein [2004] was eventually published in a journal as Perez-
Castrillo and Wettstein [2006]. However, proofs of some important results are found only in Perez-Castrillo and
Wettstein [2004].
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mechanism, can be used as a tool for the social planner. The game form itself is defined independently
of the preferences of members in the society. As the literature on implementation theory has proposed,
properly designed game forms can realize desirable allocations in equilibrium of the games even if the
social planner is given an insufficient amount of information.
In the literature, Perez-Castrillo and Wettstein [2005] have proposed a simple game form that
implements the ordinal Shapley value in subgame-perfect equilibrium. However, applicability of their
game form is limited in the sense that their game form works for economies with three or less agents.2
In the present paper, we also propose a game form that fully implements the ordinal Shapley value in
subgame-perfect equilibrium. However, our game form differs from the one proposed by Perez-Castrillo
and Wettstein [2005] in that our game form works for economies with three or more agents. On the
other hand, our game form as well as their game form is designed so that every equilibrium allocation
possesses properties such as efficiency, consistency, and fairness as the ordinal Shapley value does.
In the field of implementation theory, Moore and Repullo [1988] have developed a canonical game
form for subgame-perfect implementation of a social choice correspondence in general environments
with three or more agents. They present a sufficient condition, called the condition C+, for achieving
implementation with their canonical game form. The condition C+ contains the existence of a finite
sequence of allocations satisfying certain preference relations. Unfortunately, it is not immediately
clear whether such a sequence exists for the ordinal Shapley value, and hence it is not clear whether
the ordinal Shapley value can be implemented by their canonical game form. So, we consider that it is
worthwhile to design a new game form specifically for the ordinal Shapley value.
The remaining part of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 explains a model of pure exchange
economies where the ordinal Shapley value is defined, and introduces the notion of implementation.
Section 3 proposes a game form that implements the ordinal Shapley value in subgame-perfect equilib-
rium. Section 4 provides some concluding remarks.
2. The Model
Let N = {1, 2, . . . , n} be a set of agents with at least three members (n ≥ 3). A coalition is a non-
empty subset of N , and it is typically denoted by S. We consider a pure exchange economy with ℓ ≥ 2
commodities. Agent i’s initial endowment bundle is ωi ∈ Rℓ, where R is the set of real numbers. An
endowment profile of a coalition S is denoted by ωS ≡ (ωi)i∈S . Agent i’s consumption bundle and
2Perez-Castrillo and Wettstein [2005] have pointed out that the difficulty for their mechanism to work for
three or more agents is due to the transfer paradox as discussed in Safra [1984].
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coalition S’s consumption profile are denoted by xi ∈ Rℓ and xS ≡ (xi)i∈S , respectively.3
We assume that each agent i has a continuous and monotone4 preference relation Ri defined over
Rℓ. As usual, xiRiyi means that xi is at least as good as yi for agent i. The associated strict preference
relation and indifference relation are denoted by Pi and Ii, respectively. That is, xi Pi yi means that
agent i prefers xi to yi and xi Ii yi means that agent i is indifferent between xi and yi. Let Ri be the set
of admissible preferences of agent i. A preference profile of a coalition S is denoted by RS ≡ (Ri)i∈S
and the set of admissible preference profiles of a coalition S is denoted by RS ≡ ×i∈SRi.
The set of feasible allocations for a coalition S with ωS is denoted by
XS(ωS) ≡ {xS ∈ Rℓ|S| :
∑
i∈S
xi ≤
∑
i∈S
ωi}.
A feasible allocation xS ∈ XS(ωS) is efficient for a coalition S with RS and ωS if there is no other
feasible allocation yS ∈ XS(ωS) such that yi Ri xi for all i ∈ S and yj Pj xj for some j ∈ S.
Perez-Castrillo and Wettstein [2004] have proposed a solution concept called the ordinal Shapley
value for pure exchange economies described above. To define the ordinal Shapley value, we use the
base bundle denoted by e ≡ (1, . . . , 1) ∈ Rℓ.
Definition. The ordinal Shapley value of an economy of a coalition S with RS and ωS is a set-
valued function φ(RS , ωS) ⊂ XS(ωS), which is defined recursively as follows.
(|S| = 1) In the case of an economy with one agent i ∈ S = {i}, the ordinal Shapley value is his
endowment bundle, i.e., φ(Ri, ωi) = {ωi}.
For |S| ≥ 2, suppose that φ has been defined for any economy with (|S| − 1) or less agents.
(|S| ≥ 2) In this case, the ordinal Shapley value is the set of efficient allocations for S with RS
and ωS such that for each xS in the ordinal Shapley value, there exists an |S|-tuple of concession
vectors, (ci)i∈S with ci ≡ (cij)j∈S\{i} ∈ R|S|−1 for each i ∈ S, and the vectors satisfy the following two
properties.
(Consistency) For each i ∈ S, there exists x′S\{i} ∈ φ(RS\{i}, (ωj + cije)j∈S\{i}) such that xj Ij x′j
for all j ∈ S \ {i}.
(Fairness)
∑
j∈S\{i} c
i
j =
∑
j∈S\{i} c
j
i for all i ∈ S.
3We note that each agent’s consumption space is not restricted to the non-negative orthant. We have followed
Perez-Castrillo and Wettstein [2004].
4The preference relation Ri is monotone on Rℓ if xi ≫ yi then xi Pi yi.
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Perez-Castrillo and Wettstein [2004] have proved the following important facts. Fact 1 and Fact 2
are their Theorem 2, and Fact 3 follows from their Lemma 1.
Fact 1. The ordinal Shapley value φ(RS , ωS) is non-empty for all RS ∈ RS and ωS ∈ Rℓ|S|.
Fact 2. The ordinal Shapley value satisfies individual rationality. That is, for each xS ∈ φ(RS , ωS),
it is the case that xi Ri ωi for all i ∈ S.
Fact 3. For each xS ∈ φ(RS , ωS) with |S| ≥ 2, the associated |S|-tuple of concession vectors (ci)i∈S
that appear in the definition of the ordinal Shapley value is unique.
Given RN , ωN , and xN ∈ φ(RN , ωN ), we can construct a sequence Q(RN , ωN , xN ) of lists
Q(RN , ωN , xN ) ≡ [ S(t) , ωS(t)(t) ≡ (ωi(t))i∈S(t) , xS(t)(t) ≡ (xi(t))i∈S(t) ]t=1,2,...,n
as follows.
(Step 1) Let S(1) = N , ωS(1)(1) = ωN , and xS(1)(1) = xN .
(Step t) For t = 2, . . . , n, define the list as follows.
(Step t–1) Since xS(t−1)(t − 1) ∈ φ(RS(t−1), ωS(t−1)) and since we have Fact 3, there exists a
unique |S(t − 1)|-tuple of concession vectors (ci(t))i∈S(t−1) that satisfy consistency and
fairness in the definition of the ordinal Shapley value.
(Step t–2) Choose S(t) such that S(t) ⊂ S(t− 1) and |S(t)| = |S(t− 1)| − 1.
(Step t–3) Given i ∈ S(t − 1) \ S(t) and ci(t) ≡ (cij(t))j∈S(t), we can define ωS(t)(t) so that for
all j ∈ S(t), it is the case that ωj(t) = ωj(t− 1) + cij(t)e.
(Step t–4) By the consistency of (ci(t))i∈S(t−1), we can choose xS(t)(t) ∈ φ(RS(t), ωS(t)(t)) such
that xj(t− 1) Ij xj(t) for all j ∈ S(t). Note that xj Ij xj(t) for all j ∈ S(t).5
The set of sequences that can be constructed as above is denote by Q(RN , ωN , xN ).
We consider an extensive game form as studied in Moore and Repullo [1988]. In the present paper,
we define a game form that works for any given endowment profile ωN of all agents. The game form
Γ(ωN ) consists of a game tree with a set of message choices available to agents at each information set,
and an outcome function.
Agent i’s strategy mi is a function that associates agent i’s message choice from available choices
with each information set for which he is on the move. We do not consider mixed strategies in the
5We have xj Ij xj(t) since xj = xj(1) Ij xj(2) · · ·xj(t− 1) Ij xj(t).
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present paper. The set of agent i’s strategies is also called agent i’smessage space and denoted byMi. A
strategy profile is denoted by mN ≡ (mi)i∈N . The set of strategy profiles is denoted byMN ≡ ×i∈NMi.
Given a strategy profilemN , we can associate withmN a terminal node, where an outcome allocation
is realized. So, we can define an outcome function g : MN → XN (ωN ) that associates with each strategy
profile a feasible allocation for N with ωN .
A list (Γ(ωN ), RN ) defines an extensive game. Agent i’s strategy mi is a best response to a strategy
profile mN\{i} of the other agents if g(mN ) Ri g(m
′
i,mN\{i}) for all m
′
i ∈ Mi. A strategy profile mN
is a Nash equilibrium of (Γ(ωN ), RN ) if each agent chooses a best response to a strategy profile of the
others at mN ; That is, for all i ∈ N , it is the case that g(mN ) Ri g(m′i,mN\{i}) for all m′i ∈ Mi.
At Nash equilibria, no agent can gain by changing his strategy while the others keep their strategies
unchanged. A strategy profile mN is a subgame-perfect equilibrium of (Γ(ωN ), RN ) if in every subgame
of (Γ(ωN ), RN ), the strategy profile induced by mN is a Nash equilibrium. Let SPE (Γ(ωN ), RN ) be
the set of subgame-perfect equilibrium allocations corresponding to the subgame-perfect equilibria of
the game (Γ(ωN ), RN ).
6
We say that a game form Γ(ωN ) implements the ordinal Shapley value φ in subgame-perfect equi-
librium if for any given endowment profile ωN ∈ Rℓn, it is the case that SPE (Γ(ωN ), RN ) = φ(RN , ωN )
for all RN ∈ RN . This notion of implementation is called full implementation in the literature.
3. The Result
3–1. The game form
This section describes a game form that implements the ordinal Shapley value in subgame-perfect
equilibrium. Choose any arbitrary endowment profile ωN ∈ Rℓn and fix it throughout this section.
Formally, the game form Γ(ωN ) is defined as follows.
The game form Γ(ωN).
The game form Γ(ωN ) consists of a game tree with message spaces MN and an outcome function
g. The following descriptions define the game form Γ(ωN ).
Stage 1. This is a simultaneous-move stage. Each agent i ∈ N announces
(RiN , x
i
N , z
i, ti, ji, εi) ∈ RN ×XN (ωN )× N0 ×N ×N × R>0
6That is, SPE(Γ(ωN ), RN ) ≡ {xN ∈ XN (ωN ) : xN = g(mN ) for some subgame-perfect equilibrium mN of
the game (Γ(ωN ), RN )}.
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where N0 denotes the set of non-negative integers, R>0 denotes the set of strictly positive real numbers,
and it is required that xiN ∈ φ(RiN , ωN ). In addition, each agent i ∈ N also announces simultaneously
a sequence
Qi(RiN , ωN , x
i
N ) ≡ [ Si(t) , ωiSi(t)(t) , xiSi(t)(t) ]t=1,2,...,n ∈ Q(RiN , ωN , xiN )
together with a feasible allocation for the coalition Si(ti) with ωiSi(ti)(t
i)
yiSi(ti) ∈ XSi(ti)(ωiSi(ti)(ti)).
Case 1. If (RiN , x
i
N , z
i) = (R¯N , x¯N , 0) for all i ∈ N and for some (R¯N , x¯N ), then the play stops.
This is the case where all agents have announced the same (RiN , x
i
N , z
i). At this terminal node, the
outcome allocation is x¯N .
Case 2. This is the case where there exists i∗ ∈ N such that (RiN , xiN , zi) = (R¯N , x¯N , 0) ̸=
(Ri
∗
N , x
i∗
N , z
i∗) for all i ∈ N \ {i∗} and for some (R¯N , x¯N ). This case is divided into the following
subcases.
Subcase 2–1. If case 2 applies and (Ri
∗
N , x
i∗
N , z
i∗) = (R¯N , x¯N , 1) and i
∗ /∈ Si∗(ti∗) and ji∗ ∈
Si
∗
(ti
∗
), then the play proceeds to stage 2–1.
Subcase 2–2. If case 2 applies and (Ri
∗
N , x
i∗
N , z
i∗) = (R¯N , x¯N , 2) and i
∗ ∈ Si∗(ti∗), then the play
proceeds to stage 2–2.
Subcase 2–3. If case 2 applies and (Ri
∗
N , x
i∗
N , z
i∗) = (R¯N , x¯N , 3) and i
∗ ∈ Si∗(ti∗), then the play
stops. At this terminal node, the outcome allocation xN is constructed as follows. For agent i
∗, the
outcome is such that xi∗ = x
i∗
i∗(t
i∗).7 Let agent k ∈ N \ {i∗} be the agent with the least index number
among those other than agent i∗. For each i ∈ N \{i∗, k}, the outcome is such that xi = (0, . . . , 0) ∈ Rℓ.
For agent k, the outcome is such that xk =
∑
i∈N ωi −
∑
i∈N\{k} xi.
Subcase 2–4. If case 2 applies but none of the above three subcases applies, then the play stops.
At this terminal node, the outcome allocation is x¯N .
7A consumption bundle xi
∗
i∗ (t
i∗ ) is a part of a consumption profile xi
∗
Si
∗
(ti
∗
)
(ti
∗
) that appears in the sequence
Qi
∗
(Ri
∗
N , ωN , x
i∗
N ).
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Case 3. If neither case 1 nor 2 applies, then the play stops. At this terminal node, the outcome
allocation xN is constructed as follows. Let agent k be the agent with the least index number among
those who have announced the largest integer zk ∈ N0 among all agents in stage 1. That is, k ≡
min{i ∈ N : i ∈ argmaxj∈N zj}. For agent k, the outcome is such that xk = ωk + (n− 1)zke. For each
i ∈ N \ {k}, the outcome is such that xi = ωi − zke.
Stage 2–1. This stage is reached when subcase 2–1 applies in stage 1. In this stage, agent
ji
∗ ∈ Si∗(ti∗) announces a ∈ {0, 1}, and the play stops. Let agent k ∈ N \ {i∗, ji∗} be the agent with
the least index number among those other than agents i∗ and ji
∗
.
If a = 0, then the outcome allocation xN at this terminal node is constructed as follows. For
agent ji
∗
, the outcome is such that xji∗ = x
i∗
ji
∗ (ti
∗
) + εi
∗
e. For agent i∗, the outcome is such that
xi∗ = x¯i∗ − εi∗e. If N \ {i∗, ji∗ , k} is non-empty, then for each i ∈ N \ {i∗, ji∗ , k}, the outcome is such
that xi = (0, . . . , 0) ∈ Rℓ. For agent k, the outcome is such that xk =
∑
i∈N ωi −
∑
i∈N\{k} xi.
If a = 1, then the outcome allocation xN at this terminal node is constructed as follows. For
agent ji
∗
, the outcome is such that xji∗ = x¯ji∗ . For agent i
∗, the outcome is such that xi∗ =
x¯i∗ + ε
i∗e. If N \ {i∗, ji∗ , k} is non-empty, then for each i ∈ N \ {i∗, ji∗ , k}, the outcome is such that
xi = (0, . . . , 0) ∈ Rℓ. For agent k, the outcome is such that xk =
∑
i∈N ωi −
∑
i∈N\{k} xi.
Stage 2–2. This stage is reached when subcase 2–2 applies in stage 1. Stage 2–2 consists of
|Si∗(ti∗)| rounds, and agents in Si∗(ti∗) move sequentially. The play starts from round 1 and proceeds,
but the play stops before reaching the next round if some agent on the move chooses to do so. These
rounds are described as follows.
Round j ∈ {1,2, . . . , |Si∗(ti∗)|}. Let agent j¯ be the agent with the j-th least index number
among those in the coalition Si
∗
(ti
∗
). In this round, agent j¯ ∈ Si∗(ti∗) announces bj¯ ∈ {0, 1}.
If bj¯ = 0 and j < |Si∗(ti∗)|, then the play proceeds to round j + 1.
If bj¯ = 0 and j = |Si∗(ti∗)|, then the play stops and the outcome allocation xN at this terminal node
is constructed as follows. For each i ∈ Si∗(ti∗), the outcome is such that xi = yi∗i . If N \Si
∗
(ti
∗
) is non-
empty, then let agent k ∈ N \Si∗(ti∗) be the agent with the least index number among those outside the
coalition Si
∗
(ti
∗
). If N \(Si∗(ti∗)∪{k}) is non-empty, then for each i ∈ N \(Si∗(ti∗)∪{k}), the outcome
is such that xi = (0, . . . , 0) ∈ Rℓ. For agent k, the outcome is such that xk =
∑
i∈N ωi −
∑
i∈N\{k} xi.
If bj¯ = 1, then the play stops even if there still remain some rounds. At this terminal node, the
outcome allocation is x¯N .
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Theorem. The game form Γ(ωN ) implements the ordinal Shapley value φ in subgame-perfect equi-
librium. That is, for any given endowment profile ωN ∈ Rℓn, it is the case that SPE(Γ(ωN ), RN ) =
φ(RN , ωN ) for all RN ∈ RN .
This theorem is our main result. The following two sections prove the theorem.
3–2. Proof: SPE(Γ(ωN),RN) ⊂ φ(RN , ωN) for all RN ∈ RN .
Choose any arbitrary ωN ∈ Rℓn and RN ∈ RN and fix them throughout this section. This RN is
regarded as a ‘true’ preference profile of agents. Furthermore, choose any arbitrary subgame-perfect
equilibrium allocation x¯N ∈ SPE (Γ(ωN ), RN ). This section proves that x¯N ∈ φ(RN , ωN ).
Lemma 1. A subgame-perfect equilibrium allocation x¯N ∈ SPE(Γ(ωN ), RN ) is realized only when
case 1 of stage 1 applies on the equilibrium path.
Proof. Suppose, by way of contradiction, that case 1 of stage 1 does not apply on the equilibrium
path. Then, there exist at least (n − 1) agents who have an opportunity in stage 1 to change his
announcement so that case 3 of stage 1 applies. If such an agent i changes his announcement of zi so
that zi > zj for all j ∈ N \ {i}, then he can obtain the outcome xi = ωi + (n− 1)zie such that xi Pi x¯i
for sufficiently large zi. That is, this agent can gain by deviating from the equilibrium path.
By Lemma 1, we may assume that in subgame-perfect equilibrium, all agents in stage 1 announce
(R¯N , x¯N , 0) such that x¯N ∈ φ(R¯N , ωN ) for some R¯N ∈ RN .
Lemma 2. Suppose that all agents in stage 1 announce (R¯N , x¯N , 0) such that x¯N ∈ φ(R¯N , ωN ) in
subgame-perfect equilibrium. For any sequence
Q(R¯N , ωN , x¯N ) ≡ [ S(t) , ωS(t)(t) , xS(t)(t) ]t=1,2,...,n ∈ Q(R¯N , ωN , x¯N ),
for any t ∈ N , and for any i ∈ S(t), it is the case that x¯i Ri xi(t).
Proof. Suppose, by way of contradiction, that there exists a sequence Q(R¯N , ωN , x¯N ) such that for
some t′ ∈ N and some i′ ∈ S(t′), it is the case that xi′(t′) Pi′ x¯i′ . If agent i′ announces (R¯N , x¯N , 3)
together with t′ and Q(R¯N , ωN , x¯N ) in stage 1, then subcase 2–3 applies and agent i′ can obtain the
outcome xi′(t
′). That is, agent i′ can gain by deviating from the equilibrium path.
Lemma 3. Suppose that all agents in stage 1 announce (R¯N , x¯N , 0) such that x¯N ∈ φ(R¯N , ωN ) in
8
? ?? ?
Implementation of the ordinal Shapley value for an economy with three or more agents
subgame-perfect equilibrium. For any sequence
Q(R¯N , ωN , x¯N ) ≡ [ S(t) , ωS(t)(t) , xS(t)(t) ]t=1,2,...,n ∈ Q(R¯N , ωN , x¯N ),
for any t ∈ N , and for any i ∈ S(t), it is the case that xi(t)Ri x¯i.
Proof. Suppose, by way of contradiction, that there exists a sequence Q(R¯N , ωN , x¯N ) such that for
some t′ ∈ N and some j′ ∈ S(t′), it is the case that x¯j′ Pj′ xj′(t′). Since agent j′ has a continuous
preference relation, there exists a positive real number ε′ > 0 such that x¯j′ Pj′ (xj′(t
′) + ε′e).
Since x¯j′ = xj′(1) by the construction of the sequence, the fact that x¯j′ Pj′ xj′(t
′) implies that
t′ ≥ 2. Furthermore, since t′ ≥ 2 and hence S(t′)  N , there exists an agent i′ /∈ S(t′). We will show
that agent i′ can gain by a unilateral deviation from the equilibrium path.
If agent i′ announces (R¯N , x¯N , 1, t′, j′, ε′) together with Q(R¯N , ωN , x¯N ) in stage 1, then subcase
2–1 applies and the play proceeds to stage 2–1. In the subgame to follow, agent j′ in stage 2–1 obtains
(xj′(t
′)+ε′e) if he announces a = 0, and he obtains x¯j′ if he announces a = 1. Since x¯j′Pj′ (xj′(t
′)+ε′e),
agent j′ must choose a = 1 according to his equilibrium strategy for this subgame.
When agent j′ announces a = 1 in this subgame, agent i′ obtains the outcome (x¯i′ + ε
′e). Since
ε′ > 0 and agent i′ has a monotone preference relation, agent i′ should prefer this outcome to the
equilibrium outcome x¯i′ .
Lemma 4. Suppose that all agents in stage 1 announce (R¯N , x¯N , 0) such that x¯N ∈ φ(R¯N , ωN ) in
subgame-perfect equilibrium. For any sequence
Q(R¯N , ωN , x¯N ) ≡ [ S(t) , ωS(t)(t) , xS(t)(t) ]t=1,2,...,n ∈ Q(R¯N , ωN , x¯N ),
for any t ∈ N , and for any i ∈ S(t), it is the case that x¯i Ii xi(t).
Proof. This is a direct implication of Lemmas 2 and 3.
Lemma 5. Suppose that all agents in stage 1 announce (R¯N , x¯N , 0) such that x¯N ∈ φ(R¯N , ωN ) in
subgame-perfect equilibrium. For any sequence
Q(R¯N , ωN , x¯N ) ≡ [ S(t) , ωS(t)(t) , xS(t)(t) ]t=1,2,...,n ∈ Q(R¯N , ωN , x¯N )
and for any t ∈ N , an allocation xS(t)(t) is efficient for S(t) with RS(t)(t) and ωS(t)(t).
9
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Proof. Suppose, by way of contradiction, that for some sequence Q(R¯N , ωN , x¯N ) and for some
t′ ∈ N , there exists an allocation yS(t′) ∈ XS(t′)(ωS(t′)) such that yi Ri xi(t′) for all i ∈ S(t′) and
yj Pj xj(t
′) for some j ∈ S(t′). Then, since each agent has a continuous and monotone preference
relation, there exists an allocation y′S(t′) ∈ XS(t′)(ωS(t′)) such that y′i Pi xi(t′) for all i ∈ S(t′).8 Note
that y′iPi x¯i for all i ∈ S(t′) since x¯i Iixi(t′) for all i ∈ S(t′) by Lemma 4. Consider any agent i′ ∈ S(t′).
We will show that agent i′ can gain by a unilateral deviation from the equilibrium path.
If agent i′ announces (R¯N , x¯N , 2) together with t′ and Q(R¯N , ωN , x¯N ) and y′S(t′) in stage 1, then
subcase 2–2 applies and the play proceeds to stage 2–2. We use backward induction arguments for the
subgame that starts at the beginning of stage 2–2 given the above announcement by agent i′.
First, consider any subgame that starts at the beginning of round |S(t′)|. In this round, agent i on
the move obtains y′i if he announces b
i = 0, and he obtains x¯i if he announces b
i = 1. Since y′i Pi x¯i,
agent i must choose bi = 0 according to his equilibrium strategy for this subgame.
Next, consider any subgame that starts at the beginning of round k such that k < |S(t′)|. In this
round, if agent i on the move announces bi = 0, then the play proceeds to round k + 1 and he obtains
y′i eventually. If he announces b
i = 1, then he obtains x¯i. Since y
′
i Pi x¯i, agent i must choose b
i = 0
according to his equilibrium strategy for this subgame.
The above arguments show that, by a deviation to a path to stage 2–2, agent i′ can obtain the
outcome y′i′ that he should prefer to the equilibrium outcome x¯i′ .
Lemma 6. Suppose that all agents in stage 1 announce (R¯N , x¯N , 0) such that x¯N ∈ φ(R¯N , ωN ) in
subgame-perfect equilibrium. For any sequence
Q(R¯N , ωN , x¯N ) ≡ [ S(t) , ωS(t)(t) , xS(t)(t) ]t=1,2,...,n ∈ Q(R¯N , ωN , x¯N )
and for any t ∈ N , an allocation xS(t)(t) is in φ(RS(t), ωS(t)(t)).
Proof. We use induction arguments to show xS(t)(t) ∈ φ(RS(t), ωS(t)(t)) for t = n, n− 1, . . . , 1.
(t = n) Take any sequence Q(R¯N , ωN , x¯N ) ∈ Q(R¯N , ωN , x¯N ). Since |S(t)| = 1, it is the case
that φ(R¯S(t), ωS(t)(t)) = φ(RS(t), ωS(t)(t)) = {ωS(t)(t)} by the definition of the ordinal Shapley value.
Since xS(t)(t) ∈ φ(R¯S(t), ωS(t)(t)) by the construction of the sequence, it is the case that xS(t)(t) ∈
8If |S(t′)| = 1, then yj Pj xj(t′) for j ∈ S(t′) = {j}. If |S(t′)| ≥ 2, then we can construct an allocation
y′
S(t′) ∈ XS(t′)(ωS(t′)) such that y′i = yi + δe for all i ∈ S(t′) \ {j} and y′j = yj − (|S(t′)| − 1)δe with very
small δ > 0. If δ is sufficiently small, then it is the case that y′i Pi xi(t
′) for all i ∈ S(t′) since each agent has a
continuous and monotone preference relation.
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φ(RS(t), ωS(t)(t)).
(t ≤ n− 1) We assume that it has been shown that xS(t+1)(t+ 1) ∈ φ(RS(t+1), ωS(t+1)(t+ 1)) for
all Q(R¯N , ωN , x¯N ) ∈ Q(R¯N , ωN , x¯N ).
Take any sequence Q(R¯N , ωN , x¯N ) ∈ Q(R¯N , ωN , x¯N ). By Lemma 5, we know that xS(t)(t) is
efficient for S(t) with RS(t)(t) and ωS(t)(t). Since xS(t)(t) ∈ φ(R¯S(t), ωS(t)(t)) by the construction of the
sequence, there exists a unique9 |S(t)|-tuple of concession vectors, (ci)i∈S(t) with ci ≡ (cij)j∈S(t)\{i} ∈
R|S(t)|−1 for each i ∈ S(t), and the concession vectors satisfy the consistency condition with respect
to R¯S(t)(t), and the fairness condition,
∑
j∈S(t)\{i} c
i
j =
∑
j∈S(t)\{i} c
j
i for all i ∈ S(t).10 Considering
the definition of the ordinal Shapley value, we are left to show that the concession vectors satisfy the
consistency condition with respect to RS(t)(t) in order to prove that xS(t)(t) ∈ φ(RS(t), ωS(t)(t)). The
following claim shows the result and completes the proof of the present lemma.
Claim. For each i ∈ S(t), there exists x′S(t)\{i} ∈ φ(RS(t)\{i}, (ωj(t) + cije)j∈S(t)\{i}) such that
xj(t) Ij x
′
j for all j ∈ S(t) \ {i}.
Proof of Claim. Take any i′ ∈ S(t) and choose a sequence
Q′(R¯N , ωN , x¯N ) ≡ [ S′(t′) , ω′S′(t′)(t′) , x′S′(t′)(t′) ]t′=1,2,...,n ∈ Q(R¯N , ωN , x¯N )
such that [S′(t′), ω′S′(t′)(t
′), x′S′(t′)(t
′)] = [S(t′), ωS(t′)(t
′), xS(t′)(t
′)] for all t′ ≤ t and S′(t+1) = S′(t) \
{i′}. By the construction of this sequence, it is the case that ω′j(t + 1) = ω′j(t) + ci
′
j e for all j ∈
S′(t + 1). By the induction assumption, x′S′(t+1)(t + 1) ∈ φ(RS′(t+1), ω′S′(t+1)(t + 1)). Lemma 4
implies that xj(t) Ij x¯j Ij x
′
j(t+1) for all j ∈ S′(t+1). Therefore, we have shown that x′S′(t+1)(t+1) ∈
φ(RS(t)\{i′}, (ωj(t)+c
i′
j e)j∈S(t)\{i′}) and xj(t)Ij x
′
j(t+1) for all j ∈ S(t)\{i′}. Note that x′S′(t+1)(t+1)
can be interpreted as x′S(t)\{i} that appears in the statement of the claim. Since the choice of i
′ ∈ S(t)
is arbitrary, the claim holds.
Proposition 1. SPE (Γ(ωN ), RN ) ⊂ φ(RN , ωN ) for all RN ∈ RN .
Proof. Suppose that we are given RN ∈ RN . Choose any arbitrary subgame-perfect equilibrium
allocation x¯N ∈ SPE(Γ(ωN ), RN ). By Lemma 1, we may assume that all agents in stage 1 announce
(R¯N , x¯N , 0) such that x¯N ∈ φ(R¯N , ωN ) for some R¯N ∈ RN . Choose any sequence Q(R¯N , ωN , x¯N ) ≡
[S(t), ωS(t)(t), xS(t)(t)]t=1,2,...,n ∈ Q(R¯N , ωN , x¯N ). By Lemma 6, xS(1)(1) ∈ φ(RS(1), ωS(1)(1)). Since
9The uniqueness is due to Fact 3.
10The fairness condition is independent of R¯S(t)(t).
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S(1) = N , ωS(1)(1) = ωN , and xS(1)(1) = x¯N by the construction of the sequence, it is the case that
x¯N ∈ φ(RN , ωN ).
3–3. Proof: φ(RN , ωN) ⊂ SPE(Γ(ωN),RN) for all RN ∈ RN .
Choose any arbitrary ωN ∈ Rℓn and RN ∈ RN and fix them throughout this section. This RN is
regarded as a ‘true’ preference profile of agents. Furthermore, choose any x¯N ∈ φ(RN , ωN ). This
section proves that x¯N ∈ SPE(Γ(ωN ), RN ).
We now define a strategy profile mN ∈ MN that attains x¯N as a subgame-perfect equilibrium
allocation for the game (Γ(ωN ), RN ).
The strategy profile mN ∈MN .
Stage 1. For each agent i, his announcement is such that
(RiN , x
i
N , z
i, ti, ji, εi) = (RN , x¯N , 0, 1, 1, 1)
together with an arbitrary sequence Qi(RN , ωN , x¯N ) ∈ Q(RN , ωN , x¯N ) and an arbitrary feasible allo-
cation yiN ∈ XN (ωN ).
Stage 2–1. For each subgame that starts at the beginning of stage 2–1, agent ji
∗ ∈ Si∗(ti∗) on
the move announces a = 0 if (xi
∗
ji
∗ (ti
∗
) + εi
∗
e) Pji∗ x¯ji∗ , and a = 1 otherwise.
Round j ∈ {1,2, . . . , |Si∗(ti∗)|} in stage 2–2. For each subgame that starts at the beginning
of round j in stage 2–2, agent j¯ on the move in round j announces bj¯ = 0 if yi
∗
j¯ Pj¯ x¯j¯ , and b
j¯ = 1
otherwise.
Lemma 7. For each subgame that starts at the beginning of stage 2–1, the strategy profile induced
by mN is a Nash equilibrium.
Proof. In this subgame, there is only one agent, agent ji
∗ ∈ Si∗(ti∗), who is on the move. If he
announces a = 0, then the outcome for him is xi
∗
ji
∗ (ti
∗
)+εi
∗
e. If he announces a = 1, then the outcome
for him is x¯ji∗ .
Therefore, if (xi
∗
ji
∗ (ti
∗
) + εi
∗
e) Pji∗ x¯ji∗ , then it is a best response for him to follow mji∗ and
announce a = 0. If x¯ji∗ Rji∗ (x
i∗
ji
∗ (ti
∗
) + εi
∗
e), then it is a best response for him to follow mji∗ and
announce a = 1.
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Lemma 8. For each subgame that starts at the beginning of round j ∈ {1, 2, . . . , |Si∗(ti∗)|} in stage
2–2, the strategy profile induced by mN is a Nash equilibrium.
Proof. Consider any agent j¯ who is on the move in any round j′ with j′ ≥ j in this subgame. If he
announces bj¯ = 0, then the outcome for him is either yi
∗
j¯ or x¯j¯ , depending on the announcements by
the agents in the subsequent rounds. If he announces bj¯ = 1, then the outcome for him is x¯j¯ .
Therefore, if yi
∗
j¯ Pj¯ x¯j¯ , then it is a best response for him to follow mj¯ and announce b
j¯ = 0. If
x¯j¯ Rj¯ y
i∗
j¯ , then it is a best response for him to follow mj¯ and announce b
j¯ = 1.
Since the above arguments apply for any agent on the move in this subgame, the strategy profile
induced by mN for this subgame is a Nash equilibrium.
Lemma 9. The strategy profile mN is a Nash equilibrium of the game (Γ(ωN ), RN ).
Proof. Note that the outcome allocation for the strategy profile mN is x¯N since case 1 applies in
stage 1.
Consider any agent i ∈ N . We will prove that mi is a best response to mN\{i} by showing that
agent i cannot obtain an outcome better than x¯i even if he unilaterally quits following mi and changes
his announcements when he is on the move.
By Lemma 8, we know that in any subgame that starts in stage 2–2, agent i’s best response is
to follow mi. So, we may assume that agent i moves according to mi in stage 2–2. Henceforth, we
investigate whether agent i can obtain an outcome better than x¯i by changing his announcements in
stage 1. By such a deviation, agent i can become agent i∗ and obtain an outcome realized in either
subcase 2–1, 2–2, 2–3, or 2–4.
First, suppose that subcase 2–1 applies due to agent i∗’s deviation. In stage 2–1 to follow, agent ji
∗
moves. We note that i∗ ̸= ji∗ since i∗ /∈ Si∗(ti∗) and ji∗ ∈ Si∗(ti∗). By the construction of the sequence
Qi
∗
(RN , ωN , x¯N ) announced by agent i
∗ in this subcase, it is the case that x¯ji∗ Iji∗ x
i∗
ji
∗ (ti
∗
). Since
εi
∗
> 0 and agent ji
∗
has a monotone preference relation, it is the case that (xi
∗
ji
∗ (ti
∗
)+ εi
∗
e)Pji∗ x¯ji∗
and hence agent ji
∗
announces a = 0 according to mji∗ . Therefore, the outcome for agent i
∗ is
(x¯i∗ − εi∗e), which is worse than x¯i∗ since agent i∗ has a monotone preference relation.
Second, suppose that subcase 2–2 applies due to agent i∗’s deviation. In stage 2–2 to follow, agents
in Si
∗
(ti
∗
) move sequentially. We now pay attention to xi
∗
Si
∗
(ti
∗
)
(ti
∗
) in the sequence Qi
∗
(RN , ωN , x¯N )
announced by agent i∗ in this subcase. Since xi
∗
Si
∗
(ti
∗
)
(ti
∗
) ∈ φ(RSi∗ (ti∗ ), ωSi∗ (ti∗ )(ti
∗
)), the definition
of the ordinal Shapley value tells us that xi
∗
Si
∗
(ti
∗
)
(ti
∗
) is efficient for Si
∗
(ti
∗
) with RSi∗ (ti∗ ) and
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ωSi∗ (ti∗ )(t
i∗). Therefore, by comparing agent i∗’s announcements of xi
∗
Si
∗
(ti
∗
)
(ti
∗
) and yi
∗
Si
∗
(ti
∗
)
∈
XSi∗ (ti∗ )(ωSi∗ (ti∗ )(t
i∗)), we can say that there exists some agent j ∈ Si∗(ti∗) such that xi∗j (ti
∗
)Rj y
i∗
j .
Furthermore, by the construction of the sequence Qi
∗
(RN , ωN , x¯N ), it is the case that x¯j Ij x
i∗
j (t
i∗).
Therefore, we can say that there exists some agent j ∈ Si∗(ti∗) such that x¯j Rj yi∗j . This agent j
announces bj = 1 according to mj when he is on the move in stage 2–2. So, it cannot happen that
every agent j′ in Si
∗
(ti
∗
) announces bj
′
= 0 sequentially in stage 2–2. Therefore, the outcome allocation
is x¯N and the outcome for agent i
∗ is x¯i∗ .
Third, suppose that subcase 2–3 applies due to agent i∗’s deviation. In this subcase, the outcome
for agent i∗ is xi
∗
i∗(t
i∗). By the construction of the sequence Qi
∗
(RN , ωN , x¯N ) announced by agent i
∗
in this subcase, it is the case that x¯i∗ Ii∗ x
i∗
i∗(t
i∗).
Fourth, suppose that subcase 2–4 applies due to agent i∗’s deviation. In this subcase, the outcome
allocation is x¯N and the outcome for agent i
∗ is x¯i∗ .
The above investigations show that agent i∗, namely agent i, cannot obtain an outcome better than
x¯i even if he unilaterally quits following mi and changes his announcements when he is on the move.
Since the above arguments apply not only for agent i but also for any other agent, the strategy profile
mN is a Nash equilibrium of the game (Γ(ωN ), RN ).
Proposition 2. φ(RN , ωN ) ⊂ SPE (Γ(ωN ), RN ) for all RN ∈ RN .
Proof. Suppose that we are given RN ∈ RN . Choose any arbitrary ordinal Shapley value allocation
x¯N ∈ φ(RN , ωN ). Consider the strategy profile mN ∈MN defined in this section. Lemmas 7 through 9
show that mN is a subgame-perfect equilibrium of the game (Γ(ωN ), RN ) and its outcome allocation
is x¯N . Therefore, x¯N ∈ SPE(Γ(ωN ), RN ).
Propositions 1 and 2 complete the proof of the theorem.
4. Conclusion
We have proposed a game form that implements the ordinal Shapley value in subgame-perfect equi-
librium. Our game form can be used as a tool for the social planner who wishes to realize the ordinal
Shapley value but does not possess information on preference relations of agents. Our game form
achieves full implementation. That is, not only every allocation in the ordinal Shapley value can be
realized as an equilibrium allocation, but also every equilibrium allocation is in fact an allocation in
the ordinal Shapley value.
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We have closely followed Perez-Castrillo andWettstein [2004] for modelling pure exchange economies
where the ordinal Shapley value is defined. We consider that one drawback of the model is the as-
sumption that each agent’s consumption space is not restricted to the non-negative orthant. This
assumption seems necessary for proving the existence of the ordinal Shapley value, but the assumption
is not standard in most microeconomics textbooks. It would be desirable if we can drop this assump-
tion and restrict each agent’s consumption space to the non-negative orthant, and still guarantee the
existence of the ordinal Shapley value and design a game form achieving its implementation.
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